Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

We are in the middle of the worst economic crisis in decades. At the same time the government is pressing ahead with spending billions of pounds on replacing the UK's nuclear weapons system Trident - to come into service in 2028 - while inflicting debilitating cuts on public services. Cut Trident and its replacement makes explicit the economic, strategic and legal case against Britain maintaining and replacing its nuclear weapons system. Download: Cut Trident and its replacement (March 2012) For hard copies please contact the CND office on either This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it or 020 7700 2393.

Trident: Nowhere to Go, published in January 2012, is a detailed analysis of government archives. These documents discussed various possible locations for siting Polaris, Trident's predecessor. In light of recent developments toward a possible independence referendum in Scotland, this timely report analyses, using the MoD's own assessments, why alternative locations to Faslane and Coulport in Scotland are simply not tenable. With locations including the 2012 Olympics sailing venue, National Trust land and densely populated residential areas, there is simply nowhere for Trident to go. Trident: Nowhere to Go is a joint publication by CND and Scottish CND. Written by: John…

This briefing has been produced for Labour Party Conference 2011 as an assessment of the actions of the party and its representatives regarding the debate on Trident replacement throughout the year.

Published in October 2010, this report examines the employment consequences of a decision to replace the Trident nuclear weapons system. The report recommends the adoption of government-funded programmes, like the Base Realignment and Closure programme operated in the USA, to ensure alternative employment in industrial communities most affected. This is in line with the TUC’s 2009 support for Just Transition towards a fuel-efficient green economy.

This Q&A outlines the Trident system, which is currently being replaced by the UK government. It describes why this policy is unnecessary and how it will increase the dangers of nuclear proliferation. It also discusses the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and how the UK and the other signatories are in breach of the agreement by failing to begin negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons as the treaty directs them to do, despite a draft document for such negotiations already existing.

This briefing provides an update on the Trident replacement programme. It examines technical details of the planned timescale and budget within the context of national and international developments.

A briefing in response to the UK government’s decision to replace the Trident missile system, this discusses the reasons why this policy is unnecessary and dangerous. Crucially, it argues that nuclear weapons do not provide a defence against terrorism – the main security threat the UK currently faces, that the UK does not in fact face a nuclear threat, and that renewing Trident will increase the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation. The supposed independence of Trident from the US is also challenged.

This paper outlines the case for the employment benefits obtained by abolishing the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. Beginning with a short history of the British nuclear deterrent, it describes how levels of employment related to the maintenance of nuclear weapons have substantially declined, and how the planned update of Trident will be carried out with substantially lower levels of ‘follow-on’ employment  but much higher costs. It then demonstrates that economic alternatives do exist for those areas currently dependent on work for the nuclear programme for employment and growth.

An outline of the costs of the UK nuclear weapons programme, including such additional costs as the conventional forces needed to protect the arsenal and its facilities, and the costs of decommissioning missiles. It notes that the UK government has stated that the costs will not come from reducing the strength of conventional military forces, and questions whether providing public services and tackling poverty, climate change and other problems will be undermined by the costs of maintaining a nuclear weapons programme.

Description of the nuclear work carried out at the Devonport dockyard in Plymouth.

CND Special Report: The next Chevaline scandal? This report has been assembled by Alan Simpson, MP for Nottingham South and specialist staff (William Peden, CND Parliamentary Officer and Louise Edge, CND Press Officer) from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), based on research undertaken over the last five years. Contents Introduction by Alan Simpson, MP for Nottingham South Section One Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmes (SSMP) – An Outline Component parts of SSMP The U.S. SSMP – A Summary The British SSMP – A Summary Summary of facts about UK SSMP and work on new warhead Are Britain and the…

Special Nuclear Material flights between the UK and US The UK has always claimed to have an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’. However for almost forty years Britain and the United States have been transferring copious amounts of technical information, materials and components for use in each other’s nuclear weapons programmes. This co-operation has taken place under a number of different agreements including the 1958 US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement (last amended in 1994), the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and the 1980 Trident Sales Agreement. One way in which transfers of nuclear materials and technology are carried out between Britain and the US…

Rolls Royce Marine Operations Ltd, Derby: What does it do? October 1999 Summary Rolls Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd, Derby produces the highly enriched uranium fuel rods for use in Royal Navy submarine pressurised water reactors. They also build and maintain these reactors. All of this occurs on the one site - Raynesway, close to the centre of Derby. Introduction In 1946, following close collaboration throughout the Second World War on designing, developing and building nuclear weapons, the U.S. severed all nuclear links with the U.K. and decided to proceed with its nuclear weapons programme on its own. The U.S.…

Why CND opposes Trident CND believes that all nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral and a waste of resources. They do nothing to increase security in the world and make difficult situations even worse. CND is opposed to the UK Trident nuclear weapon system for the following reasons: Even a single Trident warhead would, if used, devastate a huge area. Each warhead has seven times the destructive killing power of the bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945. That bomb killed 140,000 people. Nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between military and civilian targets. In 1996, the International Court of…

The future of Trident Trident's lifetime The operational lifetime of the Trident nuclear weapon system is 30 years. The four Trident submarines entered into service between 1994-2001 and therefore it can be expected that they will begin to be decommissioned soon after 2024. Preliminary thinking on a replacement system is probably already underway and development would certainly have to start by around 2010 in order for a system to be ready by 2024. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to deny that there are any plans to replace Trident. That may well be the case but the fact remains that…

This paper describes the plan to update the Trident missile system as unnecessary at time when the UK faces no threat from a nuclear-armed state, and also as likely to increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation. The paper raises concerns about recent turns in both UK and US policy towards the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear armed countries, and argues that the US National Missile Defence programme is likely to be aimed at China, which the US sees as a potential military rival. UK involvement in the NMD programme is outlined, including the cost and other implications.

Trident and international law Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Britain is committed to eliminate its nuclear arsenal under Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which states that: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Britain agreed to make an "unequivocal commitment" to "accomplish the elimination" of its nuclear weapons, and signed…

Trident: The US connection Trident is a US nuclear system. The US provides assistance to Britain with its nuclear programme under the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. The UK Trident uses US Trident II D5 missiles, which are maintained and tested in the United States. The UK Trident warhead is closely based on the US Trident W76 warhead and was tested at the US Nevada Test Site. The UK maintains close links with the US nuclear weapons laboratories, on "stockpile stewardship", ie maintaining and developing nuclear warheads. The UK relies on US satellite navigation, intelligence and targetting information UK nuclear…

Trident refit and refuelling Trident is a nuclear powered submarine. The propulsion unit (that powers the submarine) is a marine Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). The fuel is highly enriched natural uranium fuel plates built into modules and inserted into the reactor. This revolutionary design allows the reactor to last for ten years without servicing; this US technology puts it well ahead of the competition. After ten years, after which the submarines will go for a total refit. Of the Trident series, HMS Vanguard is currently undergoing the completion stages of its refit and HMS Vengeance, Victorious and Vigilant are due…

Trident-related bases Development and maintenance of a nuclear weapon system like Trident requires massive infrastructure. There are Trident-related bases all over Britain and in addition the UK Trident uses facilities in the United States. These are just some of the British bases involved: Aldermaston The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, near Reading is at the centre of British nuclear weapons design and production. It is responsible for design, production, maintenance and the decommissioning of Britain's nuclear warheads. Aldermaston cooperates extensively with nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States on research and development, and maintaining the UK's current Trident warheads.…

A paper in response to Ministerial briefings to the Parliamentary Labour Party outlining criticism of the intention to replace the Trident nuclear weapons programme. It argues that the UK government has failed to allow sufficient time for a debate on the issue, and questions the need for an immediate decision to be made. It argues that replacing Trident contradicts the UK’s treaty obligations, and will increase the chances of nuclear proliferation, as well as being hugely costly. It outlines why arguments concerning the programme’s supposed role in job creation are misplaced, and also presents evidence that the programme is not…

This paper argues that the decision on replacing Trident should not be taken on the basis of employment and skills concerns as opposed to UK national security. It argues that the long-term decline of employment in military dependent industries will not be reversed by replacing Trident due to market forces, and sets out ways in which skilled personnel could be used as part of the decommissioning process, thus bringing new forms of employment to ex-military skilled workers.

This paper calls on the government not to replace the Trident system, arguing this is the best policy for UK national security as it will lessen the dangers of nuclear proliferation and a new arms race, as well as meeting UK treaty obligations and freeing large sums of money for public services and social goals. It notes that nuclear weapons will provide no protection against terrorist attacks, and have no rationale in a world where the UK faces no substantial nuclear threat.

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