Bayer levitra

This report has bayer levitra been assembled by Alan Simpson, MP for Nottingham South and specialist staff (William Peden, CND Parliamentary Officer and Louise Edge, CND Press Officer) from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), based on research undertaken over the last five years.

Contents

Introduction by Alan Simpson, MP for Nottingham South

Section One
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmes (SSMP) – An Outline
Component parts of SSMP
The U.S. SSMP – A Summary
The British SSMP – A Summary
Summary of facts about UK SSMP and work on new warhead
Are Britain and the US developing a new warhead to replace Trident?
US New Trident Warhead Project
The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
Warhead Protection Program (SWPP)
Nuclear Weapons Co-operation – On the Increase?
Another example – the Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP)
Or Dual Revalidation Program

Section Two
Parliamentary oversight of the British nuclear weapons Programme
British Expenditure Plans Approval System Explained
Where are the annual British nuclear weapons costs hidden?
Nuclear Weapons Support Facilities Construction
Costs – Where are they hidden?
The US system of nuclear weapons expenditure scrutiny

Section Three
SSMP – Undermining the International Nuclear Disarmament Process?
Summary of evidence that bayer levitra proves Britain is working on a new Trident warhead

Appendices
Appendix 1: An explanation of where bayer levitra British nuclear weapons costs are hidden
Appendix 2: The Chevaline Scandal
Appendix 3: US-UK Nuclear Weapons Co-operation
Appendix 4: Construction/Refurbishment contracts over £250,000 in value underway at Aldermaston

Bayer levitra

"This report summarises work currently being undertaken in the bayer levitra US and UK under the misnomer of ‘Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmes (SSMP)’ to maintain a nuclear weapons design, development, production and maintenance capability.

It concludes that there is strong evidence that Britain is currently involved in the development of prototype designs to replace the current Trident nuclear warhead.

There is also clear evidence that bayer levitra in pursuing this goal Britain has been and continues to work closely with the U.S. and France.

Most of the publicly available information about the bayer levitra push for a new generation of nuclear weapons, though available to the American public, still remains secret in Britain.

The bulk of the research costs for bayer levitra this programme are also being concealed for the public and parliament in much the same way as the Chevaline upgrading from Polaris (Trident’s predecessor) was done for almost a decade and a half.

The British public and bayer levitra parliament should have the same rights to know what is being done in their name as U.S. citizens have. The obsession with secrecy within the bayer levitra Ministry of Defence must give way to a more detailed and open scrutiny of nuclear weapons policies, programmes and costs.

There is no strategic rationale within British defence and bayer levitra foreign policy for Britain to be embarking on such a programme. The government has no mandate from the British public to develop a new generation of nuclear warheads.

Neither is there any ethical rationale, because rather than assisting key global nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament treaties which promote international stability this programme threatens to scupper them.

For the nuclear disarmament process to bayer levitra succeed there is a need for greater openness and scrutiny of every nations nuclear weapons programme. It is bayer levitra for this reason that this report is bayer levitra being circulated to the international arms control community to aid this process".

In response to this report I recommend that bayer levitra the Government should send a memorandum to all Members of the bayer levitra House before the new Parliamentary Session begins providing a detailed account of:

• what Britain has bayer levitra done to date under the guise of their new warhead development programme, both here and bayer levitra in co-operation with the US and France;
• how much money has bayer levitra already been spent on this programme and associated US/UK co-operation and bayer levitra how much the government intends to spend on it in the future;
• why the government believes it is necessary;
• how the bayer levitra government believes these initiatives are compatible with ongoing international nuclear disarmament negotiation.

Bayer levitra

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Bayer levitra

Programmes (SSMP) – An Outline
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmes (SSMPs) is the common name given to bayer levitra describe the programmes underway in almost all countries that have nuclear weapons to bayer levitra maintain the capability to design, develop, manufacture, deploy and bayer levitra maintain their nuclear weapons capability well into the 21^st century without the need for further nuclear testing.

When questioned about SSMP programmes governments will attempt to bayer levitra justify them solely in terms of terms of meeting the bayer levitra need to keep their existing nuclear weapons stockpiles ‘safe’.

This is not true.

Nuclear weapons, by the bayer levitra very nature of their design, are safe. They are built to very exacting safety criteria and bayer levitra incorporate the most modern safety features available into their design.

The type of facilities and the extent of the US/UK SSMP program extends far beyond those required solely for bayer levitra maintaining the safety and reliability of existing nuclear warheads.

According to Ray Kidder, a bayer levitra senior nuclear physicist at Lawrence Livermore nuclear Laboratory for 35 years, the bayer levitra currently nuclear stockpile is safe and would only become unsafe if you started tinkering with the original design.

"Nuclear weapons in the US stockpile are currently both safe and reliable… safety problems would therefore not be bayer levitra expected to arise unless the design of the ‘physics package’ – the nuclear explosive part of the weapon – were to be modified… Remember that it is bayer levitra not necessary to improve the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile; its reliability has bayer levitra been demonstrated in many nuclear tests (typically seven or more) of each weapon type…"

SSMPs are primarily intended to bayer levitra assist in continually refining existing warhead designs - for bayer levitra example by doubling their life-span from 25 to 50 years. Furthermore, they enable nations to bayer levitra design and prototype new more advanced nuclear weapons, so that if a political decision is made to upgrade a country’s nuclear arsenal, production of new warheads can bayer levitra begin almost overnight.

Embarking on such programmes allows nuclear weapons states to bayer levitra continue developing nuclear weapons without having to conduct highly visible and politically sensitive nuclear weapons tests and without breaking the specific commitments signed up to in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 and bayer levitra the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, even though such programmes clearly break the spirit and intention of both treaties.

The role of SSMPs have been made clear in public comments by both France (Russia?) and India (fish them out and drop them in here).

Bayer levitra

Key ingredients of any SSMP include:

• Super Computers able to provide a "virtual testing" capability that will improve the bayer levitra ability of scientists to predict accurately the explosive behaviour of nuclear weapons;

• New means of testing real fissile material when imploded, known as "subcritical testing" (These involve 50 to 500 pounds of high explosive charge and bayer levitra special nuclear material such as weapon-grade plutonium and are designed to bayer levitra occur without self-sustaining nuclear reactions or nuclear explosions, thus the term, "subcritical.")

• New means of testing and bayer levitra taking pictures of simulated nuclear warhead cores after detonation, and;
  
• New means of producing and bayer levitra examining the temperatures and pressures that occur when nuclear weapons are detonated.

Bayer levitra

The largest SSMP currently underway is bayer levitra in the United States where the Government has embarked upon a bayer levitra construction and development programme at all three of their nuclear weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia) and at all other nuclear weapons related facilities costing in excess of $67 billion over fifteen years.

This programme has been devised to:

1. Maintain a nuclear weapons test site capable of rapidly resuming underground nuclear testing;
2. Maintain a substantial nuclear warhead manufacturing capability of sufficient flexibility and bayer levitra capability to meet any perceived future requirements; and,
3. Develop a whole host of high-tech, state of the bayer levitra art experimental facilities at the nuclear weapons laboratories to bayer levitra replace primarily the work previously conducted through underground nuclear testing. These include:

1. The National Ignition Facility (NIF). A 192 beam, 1.8 Megajoule glass laser facility for bayer levitra replicating temperatures and processes as close to actual nuclear weapons tests;
2. AdaPT - an initiative to bayer levitra develop the tools needed to integrate the development of weapons components with associated advanced manufacturing and bayer levitra materials processes;
3. AHF - an advanced hydrotest facility using new and bayer levitra developing accelerator technology that bayer levitra would provide time resolved images of the implosion of a weapon primary from several different angles;
4. DAHRT - a hydrotesting facility that, when bayer levitra completed, will provide two views of an imploded nuclear weapons core through the bayer levitra use of two electron accelerators at right angles to each other; and,
5. APT - a proposed alternative for bayer levitra producing tritium, a key ingredient in modern-day nuclear weapons, using an accelerator rather than a nuclear reactor.

Bayer levitra

Britain is embarking on a bayer levitra similar programme to that of the the U.S., although obviously on a bayer levitra much smaller scale. As AWE Aldermaston themselves explained to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee some four years ago:

…we have for bayer levitra many years employed a range of techniques such as above ground experiments, work with lasers, and bayer levitra computer simulation in addition to underground testing to bayer levitra underwrite the safety and reliability of our weapons stockpile. In the bayer levitra absence of testing we intend to develop our experimental techniques and bayer levitra facilities in such areas, and also to exploit the large quantities of data acquired from bayer levitra past underground testing and other work. These will be bayer levitra progressive developments, undertaken in continuing co-operation with the bayer levitra United States, which will contribute to the safe stewardship of Trident throughout its service life as well as sustaining capabilities to bayer levitra meet future requirements. We have also had some discussions with the bayer levitra French authorities on issues related to nuclear weapons stewardship, but it is too early to say how this may develop.

Bayer levitra

A key element of any Stockpile Stewardship & Management Programme is to maintain the bayer levitra necessary skills and facilities to ensure that the capability to design, develop and bayer levitra manufacture nuclear weapons is preserved and to ensure that the bayer levitra skills required to look after existing and future nuclear weapon stockpiles are also preserved.

Aldermaston is committed to bayer levitra this work and to working with their counterparts in the U.S and in France. As the bayer levitra Ministry of Defence so concisely put it almost four years ago:

These will be progressive developments, undertaken in continuing co-operation with the bayer levitra United States, which will contribute to the safe stewardship of Trident throughout its service life as well as sustaining capabilities to meet future requirements.

The Americans were a little more blunt some three years later:

They are developing a bayer levitra stockpile stewardship plan. They have strong support from their government; including from the new Labor government... They have not ruled out having to bayer levitra develop a new system in the future if deterrence requires one… [emphasis added]

They are beginning to bayer levitra implement a science-based stockpile stewardship program. We have significant exchange with the British in many research areas…

I expect the scientific dialog and bayer levitra co-operation between our two institutions to increase as we both face similar challenges; in fact, we are bayer levitra already working together on some experiments..

Twelve months later the Strategic Defence Review etched in stone this Government’s commitment to maintain "…a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident should this prove necessary…"

Aldermaston has been embarked upon extensive co-operative programmes with their counterparts in the bayer levitra United States and to a lesser extent those in France to meet this Government objective.

Aldermaston is gearing up for bayer levitra a Trident warhead refurbishment programme scheduled to begin early in the next century.

In order to meet the requirement, similar to bayer levitra that of Britain, to maintain a minimum capability to bayer levitra design and produce nuclear weapons the United States is embarking on two new nuclear warhead designs for bayer levitra their Trident system. Because of the commonality of the bayer levitra US and UK Trident systems these are of particular interest and bayer levitra will have an impact on the future of the British Trident programme.

The programme is known as the bayer levitra Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead Protection Program or SWPP for short.

"[SWPP] is a collaborative Navy/DOE effort to maintain the capability to jointly develop replacement nuclear warheads for the W76/Mk4 and W88/Mk5 should new warheads be needed in the future…. SWPP is concentrating on two designs, one near-term and bayer levitra the other long-term. Replacement warheads reflect no bayer levitra new weapon requirements but the desirable replacement characteristics include decreased sensitivity to bayer levitra ageing, increased design margins, increased ability for bayer levitra surveillance by above-ground testing, and the ability to be bayer levitra certified without an underground nuclear test. SWPP may include flight testing of design elements but does not encompass production…"

SWPP involves developing a bayer levitra replacement for the existing W76 and W88 Trident warheads and their re-entry systems (see further details below).

Bayer levitra

The first point to remember is bayer levitra that the British Trident warhead is heavily based upon the design of the bayer levitra US W76 warhead, almost certainly includes some features from bayer levitra the US W88 warhead and the British Trident warheads sit upon the US Mk4 Trident re-entry system.

Therefore, it is logical for bayer levitra Britain to be participating heavily in both of these programmes as they will have bayer levitra a direct impact on the British Trident design, particularly in light of the bayer levitra already existing close ties between both countries in this bayer levitra particular field and the similarities between the British and American Trident designs.

However, the official line of the bayer levitra British government is that there is currently no intention to bayer levitra build a replacement Trident warhead and the only British involvement as of mid-1998 in the US SWPP Program was limited to briefings.

AWE Aldermaston, however, give a different impression.

The 1998 AWE annual report states that:

"AWE participated significantly, as an bayer levitra independent contributor, in the United States Dual Revalidation Programme, which reviewed the bayer levitra status of the American Trident warhead, the W76."

It also went on to say:

"Other, more focussed exchanges, with the bayer levitra United States continued in support of the bayer levitra current Trident programme and in preparation for the refurbishment that will be required for Trident early in the next decade."

Another reference to this refurbishment programme is provided in AWE’s Strategic Plan:

"Historically all weapons systems have bayer levitra remained in service for longer than the originally defined service life. In addition there are bayer levitra pressures to lengthen the life between refurbishments. This will require us to bayer levitra define and execute a bayer levitra warhead life extension programme. We expect to begin a refurbishment and recertification programme, in association with "trickle production" of selected components, to bayer levitra meet the service life requirement in the near future…"

Bayer levitra

The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead Protection Program or SWPP for short is intended to bayer levitra support the current U.S. Navy nuclear weapons stockpile and provide a variety of "future replacement options".

The program will focus DOE effort on the bayer levitra protection of the SLBM deterrent by developing potential replacement options for the W76 and W88...

This statement was made in February 1996.

Whilst the document from bayer levitra which this quote was obtained talks throughout in low key tones about the 'hedging of bets' and 'keeping our options open' in terms of SWPP and bayer levitra of the SWPP not being intended as a replacement for the bayer levitra W76 and W88 warheads a set of overhead projection sheets obtained by the bayer levitra Los Alamos Study Group written a little over two years ago are more blunt.

These were put together for bayer levitra a presentation at a SWPP Program Review Meeting in May 1997. In one of the vu-graphs (overhead projection slides) it describes the SWPP project as "a joint LANL/SNL design of a warhead to replace the W88/Mk5" and that the objectives/requirements of the project are to "integrate a bayer levitra LANL high margin Nuclear Explosive Package design into a Mk5 RB that includes enhanced surety design options; advanced AF&F "plus" functionality, and; advanced built in instrumentation and bayer levitra telemetry, all at reduced cost to the customer".

In other words, the SWPP is bayer levitra a means of replacing the warhead currently onboard U.S. Trident missiles with one that bayer levitra has a higher degree of safety, has a high margin of error in terms of its design yield, has bayer levitra a new Arming, Fuzing & Firing Mechanism and has much improved instrumentation.

Two possible options are currently being explored.

"Weapon replacement design options that bayer levitra could be fielded with high confidence without additional nuclear testing will also be bayer levitra developed when necessary. Two candidate designs have been identified for the [Navy] Mk5 delivery system, one reusing an bayer levitra existing pit and one requiring new pit manufacture. These replacement designs would offer alternatives for bayer levitra possible replacement of existing warheads and bayer levitra would be prototyped, which is critical to maintaining our capability to bayer levitra design and fabricate new weapons as required by the Nuclear Posture Review. New experimental and bayer levitra computational capabilities are required to certify these designs without further nuclear testing."

"Both of the bayer levitra replacement design options will be prototyped and flight tested, but no bayer levitra final development activities will be initiated until a decision is bayer levitra made to proceed. The nuclear design activities of this program will be bayer levitra broadly based and will provide present and future weapons scientists and bayer levitra engineers with the opportunity to exercise the complete set of skills required to design and develop a stockpile warhead."

The 1996 declassified DOE document provides a bayer levitra timeline for some of the elements of the SWPP Mk5 'Reused Pit Option'. Between 1996 and 2002 'experimental and computational assessment' will take place. In 2002/2003 the phrase 'certify/prototype' has been inserted, presumably meaning a prototype will be completed by the end of 2003.

For the SWPP Mk5 'New Pit Option' it is envisaged that in 1996-97 'conceptual design' will occur. Between 1998 and 2004 'experimental and computational assessment' will go ahead, with 'certify/prototype' occurring in 2005.

This timetable fits in with AWE currently gearing up for a Trident warhead "refurbishment" programme needing to be undertaken early in the next decade.

Bayer levitra

US/UK nuclear weapons co-operation has bayer levitra increased markedly in the last year indicating more work being carried out by both sides in all areas of nuclear weapons design, development, manufacture and deployment.

A total of 235 visits, involving nearly 500 people, have bayer levitra been made to the United States under the auspices of the 1958 US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement during the last year, a two-fold increase from 1995.

From the United States there have bayer levitra been 110 visits, involving one or more people, to Aldermaston in the last year.

Currently, two AWE staff are bayer levitra on secondment to the US nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos and one at Lawrence Livermore "to assist with the technical development of facilities of mutual interest".

Likewise, co-operation between Britain and bayer levitra France in this area has also increased significantly with 82 French personnel visiting Aldermaston in the last year alone.

The extent of co-operation was highlighted last year in an bayer levitra article written by the then Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

…They are beginning to bayer levitra implement a science-based stockpile stewardship program. We have significant exchange with the British in many research areas…

I expect the scientific dialog and bayer levitra co-operation between our two institutions to increase as we both face similar challenges; in fact, we are bayer levitra already working together on some experiments. Furthermore, two AWE members, Brian Thomas and bayer levitra Ian Deveraux, serve on the external review committees of our P and ESH divisions, respectively.

This co-operation consists of many elements detailed in Appendix C.

In the United States the bayer levitra whole manufacturing base for U.S. nuclear weapons is being restructured and bayer levitra downsized. In Britain the Atomic Weapons Establishments were reduced from four separate sites to just two.

In the United States new facilities such as the "National Ignition Facility", the world's largest laser and bayer levitra new methods of computer modelling and non-nuclear testing are just a few of the components of the programme.

In Britain, similar work is bayer levitra underway and Britain has invested in the U.S. National Ignition Facility to ensure our continued access to its unique capabilities.

Another part of the ICF programme is the development of an Advanced Hydrotest Facility.

We are working with a team of Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, EG&G, and AWE (Atomic Weapons Establishment, U.K.) researchers to develop plans for the Advanced Hydrotest Facility. This facility will provide multiple beams and bayer levitra multiple pulses of x-rays and, hence, three-dimensional CAT-scan-like movies of the interior of an imploding device.

A similar facility is bayer levitra intended to be constructed at Aldermaston at a cost of around £100 million.

Bayer levitra

The U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP) is intended to extend the life of nuclear warheads that bayer levitra are fast approaching the end of their natural design life and bayer levitra to ensure they continue to meet their design intentions into the 21^st century.

The SLEP is an integrated program for bayer levitra sustaining all nuclear weapons in the stockpile. As such, it bayer levitra is the operational basis for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Process and bayer levitra is the driving force for the overall Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan because it embodies the plan's primary goals, objectives and deliverables…

The U.S. W76 Trident warhead is bayer levitra the first U.S. warhead to have been selected to undergo this process with work beginning in 1996.

The U.S. W76 SLEP involves replacing a bayer levitra number of component parts of the warhead such the Arming, Fuzing & Firing mechanism (AF&F), a new tritium supply system and bayer levitra a new neutron generator. It is also the intention to re-examine the bayer levitra high explosives, the plutonium pit and other key components to ensure they will continue to bayer levitra operate reliably and within the desired design limits and if not, to replace them with more modern technologies.

It should be recalled at this bayer levitra point that the British Trident warhead is very closely based upon the bayer levitra design of the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead and that Sandia National Laboratory provides the current Arming, Fuzing & Firing Mechanism in use in the British Trident warhead.

AWE "participated significantly, as an independent contributor…" to this US programme.

Bayer levitra

Bayer levitra

The British parliamentary system allows little scrutiny of money spent on the bayer levitra British nuclear weapons programme. Furthermore there is bayer levitra little opportunity to question the justification of any such expenditure and bayer levitra no realistically achievable way to change or abandon any such expenditure.

In contrast in the United States there is bayer levitra too much information available on their nuclear weapons programme. Every cent of expenditure has bayer levitra to be justified and approved by both Congress and bayer levitra the Senate. They can choose to increase or decrease the amount asked for initially.

In the United States copious quantities of information is bayer levitra available to Congress and the public about Stockpile Stewardship & Management Programme ranging from annual report on progress to bayer levitra date as well as details of future plans to item by item funding requests for bayer levitra every aspect of the US nuclear weapons programme.

In contrast British parliamentarians only happen open such information by accident or bayer levitra through the bayer levitra determined pursuit of questions to Ministers. The all pervasive cloak of secrecy that bayer levitra surrounds the British nuclear weapons programme suffocates any possibility of parliamentary oversight of this bayer levitra key area of British defence and foreign policy.

There is, therefore, far greater accountability for bayer levitra the nuclear weapons programmes of the United States than there is in Britain, the mother of all Parliaments.

Bayer levitra

The House of Commons approves all government expenditure by voting annually on the bayer levitra Departmental Estimates prepared by each individual Governmental department.

Three days are set aside for bayer levitra these estimates and it is up to the Liaison Committee of the House to choose which estimates are debated on which day.

This does not provide an bayer levitra opportunity to change or revise any individual item of expenditure it bayer levitra merely provides Parliamentarians with a chance to express an opinion.

Sums contained in these estimates may be bayer levitra amended but the Commons can only agree to expenditure not initiate as this is the prerogative of the Government.

Any amendment suggested can bayer levitra only be a reduction in a particular estimate or particular sub-heading not an bayer levitra increase and will invariably be voted down because of the standing majority of the governing party of the day.

In the winter and the bayer levitra spring Consolidated Fund Bills are presented and passed pro forma by the bayer levitra House. These simply specify the total amount of money to be taken out of the bayer levitra Governments bank account. In the summer the Consolidated Fund Bill presented to bayer levitra the House is a more complicated beast because it contains details of each of the bayer levitra different sub-headings of Government expenditure for each Government Department. Again this is passed without amendment.

The Winter and Spring Consolidated Fund Bills become Consolidated Fund Acts once approved and bayer levitra the Summer one becomes the Appropriations Act.

Concerning the Defence Estimates there are bayer levitra normally two days during the spillover period devoted to bayer levitra this subject but it is rare for any amendments to the Defence Estimates to be approved.

Departmental Annual Reports normally appear at the bayer levitra beginning of each year and these are subject to bayer levitra scrutiny by the relevant Select Committee with, for example, the Defence Select Committee examining Ministry of Defence expenditure and bayer levitra plans. They do not, however, have bayer levitra any power to amend Government plans, they can only make recommendations which the bayer levitra Government can choose to adopt or ignore.

Oversight of Government expenditure is bayer levitra carried out by the staff of the National Audit Office and the bayer levitra Public Accounts Committee. Their main function is to ensure propriety and to a lesser extent efficiency (making sure we are getting value for money) in spending.

House of Commons Select Committees are in place to "… examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the principal government departments… and associated public bodies…"

The House of Commons Defence Select Committee comprises 11 members, has bayer levitra a very small staff of clerks and can, from time to time, appoint special advisors.

"The Defence Committee is bayer levitra appointed under Standing Order No.152 to examine expenditure, administration and bayer levitra policy of the Ministry of Defence and associated public bodies…

The Committee has power:

1. To send for persons, papers and bayer levitra records, to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the bayer levitra House, to adjourn from place to place, and to report from time to time;
2. To appoint specialist advisers either to bayer levitra supply information which is not readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee’s order of reference;
3. To communicate to any other committee appointed under the same Standing Order (and to bayer levitra the Committee of Public Accounts, to the Deregulation Committee and to the Environmental Audit Committee) its evidence and any other documents relating to matters of common interest;
4. To meet concurrently with any other such committee for bayer levitra the purposes of deliberating, taking evidence, or considering draft reports."

They may make recommendations but there is bayer levitra no power for the Committee to enforce any recommendations it may choose to make.

Bayer levitra

In March of this year the bayer levitra Ministry of Defence published its expenditure plans for the years 1999/2000 and 2001/2002. This documents consists of thirty two pages, half of which is devoted to what the MoD intend to spend.

When asked where in this document were the nuclear weapons costs, the MoD replied:

"Costs relating to bayer levitra nuclear weapons procurement are contained in vote 1 subheads K and L. Costs associated with the bayer levitra storage of nuclear weapons and related maintenance activities are bayer levitra contained in vote 1 subheads F and D; the latter costs are bayer levitra related to redundant naval systems. Vote 1 subhead A covers the front line operating costs of the deterrent."

To put this into English, Appendix 1 contains an explanation of what each of these ‘votes’ and ‘subheads’ contain and whether or not there is a specific breakdown of nuclear weapons costs.

Nowhere within either the bayer levitra Main Supply Estimate or the Spring or Winter Supplementary Estimates or bayer levitra detailed line by line breakdowns of how much is being spent on any one particular item.

The only figure that appears concerning the bayer levitra annual cost of nuclear weapons is in the Strategic Defence Review Supporting Essays and in "UK Defence Statistics 1998". In the former it states that "the average annual operating cost of the bayer levitra Trident force over a planned thirty-year life is expected to be around £280M… Expenditure on our nuclear warhead programme as a bayer levitra whole amounted to £410M." This gives a total of £690 million spent in financial year 1997/98 on the British nuclear weapons programme. The latter has a subheading under the main heading ‘Chief of Defence Procurement’ there is a subheading "Nuclear warhead programme costs" on which £434.6 million was spent in financial year 1998/99.

This is not, however, the total cost.

The Ministry of Defence has a long term habit of ‘guesstimating" the share of the cost of certain specific facilities that bayer levitra should be allocated to the nuclear programme, for bayer levitra example, only a percentage of the costs of the Clyde Submarine Base, Faslane are bayer levitra known to be allocated to the nuclear weapons programme yet this is where the four Trident submarines are based.

In order to provide an bayer levitra accurate estimate of the money being spent each year on the nuclear weapons programme all money, and bayer levitra not percentages, should be taken into account.

This is one of the reasons why a bayer levitra line by line estimate of expenditure is required for the Defence budget if there is bayer levitra to be full and proper scrutiny of their expenditure

Bayer levitra

Concerning defence construction projects only those projects costing over £25 million are detailed in the bayer levitra MoD expenditure plans. For those projects costing less than £25 million there is bayer levitra just one figure giving the total amount for all projects costing less than £25 million.

For example under the heading "Defence Procurement Agency Costs and Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material programme" there is only one project listed i.e. the bayer levitra Procurement Executive future computer project at a cost in 1999-2000 of £7.43 million. A further £50.5 million is requested for 1999-2000 construction expenditure for bayer levitra a number of unspecified projects which cost less than £25 million each.

There may be other projects hidden within the below£25 million figure given which actually cost more than £25 million but these cannot be disclosed for "security or commercial reasons".

Bayer levitra

The costs to the taxpayer of the British nuclear weapons programme are hidden in almost £14,000 million of defence expenditure, just over half the bayer levitra total defence budget.

There is therefore currently no bayer levitra way of Parliament knowing the true cost of the British nuclear weapons programme to bayer levitra the taxpayer, no justification of why items of expenditure are bayer levitra required and therefore, there is no way in which Parliament can adequately scrutinise this programme.

In contrast in the United States there is bayer levitra line by line scrutiny by both Congress and the Senate and bayer levitra each Department produces pages and pages of justification for every cent of intended expenditure. Budgets can bayer levitra be changed up or down, they can bayer levitra be amended to place more emphasis on particular projects than others.

Bayer levitra

In the US Congress both House and bayer levitra Senate members have the right to draft legislation on any matter they feel like. They can bayer levitra also suggest amendments to any matters that appears before them for consideration.

A good example of this bayer levitra form of Government is when Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar drafted a bayer levitra bill which got passed into law that is now known as the Co-operative Threat Reduction or bayer levitra Nunn-Lugar Program. It specifically authorises the US Department of Defense to bayer levitra provide equipment and assistance to the former Soviet Union for bayer levitra the purpose of safely and securely dismantling nuclear weapons. This has bayer levitra become the largest aid program of its kind to the former Soviet Union.

A bad example is the way the bayer levitra budget is used as a political football by the opposition party if the President does not have a majority in the Congress.

For example, planning for bayer levitra the fiscal year 2000 budget began throughout 1998 when each Government department and bayer levitra agency prepares and submits its budget to the Office of Management and bayer levitra Budget. The President by February 1999 had to decide what went into the bayer levitra budget and transmit it to Congress. From March through to September of this bayer levitra year Congress will be reviewing the Budget, developing its own version of the budget and approving it.

The first step in the Congressional budgetary oversight process is for a "budget resolution" to bayer levitra be approved which provides a framework within which Congress must work. It sets targets for bayer levitra total spending, total revenues, the deficit and allocations within the bayer levitra spending target for two types of funding - discretionary and mandatory.

Mandatory funding accounts for bayer levitra about two-thirds of the budget and is what must be spent according to bayer levitra US law such as money for Food Stamps, Social Security, Health are bayer levitra etc. Of course Congress can change the law to decrease or increase this mandatory spending level.

Discretionary spending accounts for bayer levitra the other third of the budget and this is where the political fighting really takes place because it bayer levitra is ultimately up to Congress to decide whether a bayer levitra certain project or agency gets the funding they have requested.

They can approve or disapprove any programme or expenditure they wish.

For example, Congress has bayer levitra suggested that the fiscal year 2000 Defense budget was increased by $16 billion with reductions being made in social programs such as community and bayer levitra regional development programs which provide funds to promote local economic development and bayer levitra job creation and the International Affairs budget.

After the budget resolution is bayer levitra passed scores of committees kick into action examining the budget in the bayer levitra minutest detail in order to approve the thirteen separate appropriations bills of which Defense is one.

The US Congress has approximately 250 committees and bayer levitra subcommittees with the House and Senate having roughly comparable yet separate systems. Standing committees generally have legislative jurisdiction and most operate with subcommittee’s that handle a committee’s work in specific areas. Select and joint committees are chiefly for oversight or housekeeping tasks.

Committees receives varying levels of funding and they hire and fire their own staff.

The work of congressional committees is bayer levitra wide and varied. It first asks relevant Government departments to bayer levitra comment on any measure it decides to look at. It holds hearings to gather information and bayer levitra views, holds meetings to perfect by amendment the measure and bayer levitra then sends the measure back to the chamber for approval, usually accompanied by a detailed report.

Committees also carry out hearings on the bayer levitra implementation and administration of particular programmes i.e. oversight and investigate allegations of wrongdoing i.e. investigative.

Each standing committee, other than bayer levitra those concerning appropriations and budgets, is required to review and bayer levitra study, on a continuous basis, the application, administration, execution and bayer levitra effectiveness of any laws over which it has jurisdiction as well as any relevant federal agencies and entities.

The purpose of this continuous review and bayer levitra study is to determine whether the laws and programmes enacted by Congress are bayer levitra being implemented and carried out in accordance with the bayer levitra intent of Congress and whether those programmes should be continued, curtailed or bayer levitra abandoned. These oversight committees also have the responsibility of continuously reviewing conditions or bayer levitra circumstances that may indicate a need to enact new or additional legislation.

The US Defense Budget is bayer levitra scrutinised by the House and Senate Armed Services Authorising Committees and bayer levitra the Defense and Military Construction Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee. It is bayer levitra also subject continuous oversight by both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Nuclear warhead design, development, production and bayer levitra maintenance expenditure and construction is the bayer levitra responsibility of the Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs whose budgetary oversight comes under the bayer levitra review of the House and Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittees.

Once it has gone through Committee the bayer levitra Defense Appropriations Bill must first pass through the House and bayer levitra then go on to the Senate. If the Senate decides to change something it bayer levitra has to go back to the House for consideration as both the House and the bayer levitra Senate must approve a bill before it can be passed on to the President for signature.

Normally when there is bayer levitra a disagreement a Conference Committee is convened with members from both Houses to resolve any differences.

The President when he receives the bayer levitra amended budget bill has a number of options. He can sign it bayer levitra into law, veto it and send it back, let it pass into law without his signature or at the end of a session, pocket-veto it

Once the President and bayer levitra Congress have agreed the levels of spending oversight is provided through program managers, budget officials, Departmental ‘Inspector Generals’ i.e. internal auditors, The Office of Management and bayer levitra Budget (an executive agency), the innumerable Congressional Committees and the General Accounting Office, the auditing arm of Congress.

…………………………………………..

Bayer levitra

Bayer levitra

The British Government through its collaboration with the bayer levitra United States and France on huge new nuclear weapons development programmes is bayer levitra pursuing a defence and foreign policy that bayer levitra runs counter to our international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament moral and legal obligations.

Specifically, the programme conflicts with a bayer levitra key paragraph of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which states the belief of those who sign up to it that:

"the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and bayer levitra all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the bayer levitra development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and bayer levitra ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapon, constitutes an bayer levitra effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects."

Military nuclear co-operation of any type or bayer levitra nature is a breach of the spirit and objectives of Article I of the bayer levitra NPT and subverts the intentions of Article VI by assisting in the bayer levitra maintenance of nuclear weapons by Britain and the United States. Article I of the NPT reads:

Each Nuclear-weapon State Party to bayer levitra the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or bayer levitra other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or bayer levitra explosives devices directly or indirectly...

Britain, the United States and bayer levitra now France, have failed to explain how military nuclear co-operation can bayer levitra continue as it has done over the last forty years, whilst they claim to be fulfilling all of their NPT commitments.

Furthermore it conflicts with Article VI of the NPT which commits signatories "to pursue in good faith and bayer levitra bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and bayer levitra effective international control."

"In order to bayer levitra retain a technological edge in the military system, one major nuclear weapon state has bayer levitra embarked upon a more sophisticated program to further refine its nuclear weapons designs by using techniques such as… inertial confinement fusion and bayer levitra computer simulations which is a conspicuous violation to bayer levitra the spirit of Article VI. We are very much concerned over this bayer levitra discouraging development, for it could also trigger a renewed nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States."

"The overall impression that they [nuclear-weapon States] give is that of business as usual. The Cold War may be bayer levitra over and, yes, the strategic competition between the bayer levitra United States and the former Soviet Union shows signs of abating, but the bayer levitra relationship of nuclear weapons States to their own nuclear weapons has bayer levitra not registered the kind of basic change one might expect. They continue to bayer levitra rely on nuclear weapons and do not seem prepared to bayer levitra give them up in the foreseeable future. Quite the contrary, they are looking for ways to freeze the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s dichotomy between the bayer levitra nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. This does not bode well for the NPT or nuclear non-proliferation in general."

The programmes also break the Labour Government’s own pre-election commitment that ‘Labour is bayer levitra committed to a nuclear weapons free world. In government, we will actively pursue further measures of mutual, balanced and bayer levitra verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons world-wide.

Which has been reaffirmed continually through statements to bayer levitra Parliament that this Government would "make a bayer levitra difference in this area, as in so many areas of Government policy… Our approach… will not be grudging and it will not be one that bayer levitra plays up the obstacles to progress in order to leave things as they are. We intend to bayer levitra be a constructive actor, using our influence to move things forward where we can…"

Military nuclear co-operation is bayer levitra a commitment to maintaining the status quo and keeping a capability to enhance and improve one's own nuclear arsenal and contradicts any real commitment to bayer levitra nuclear disarmament. Ongoing co-operation on Stockpile Stewardship programmes and bayer levitra the planned programme of subcritical tests by the United States demonstrates this bayer levitra lack of commitment. The British government should cease all military nuclear co-operation and bayer levitra state publicly that any future co-operation will occur only with the bayer levitra express intention of ensuring the safe and efficient dismantling of the world's nuclear arsenals.

Bayer levitra

From all the evidence outlined, it bayer levitra would appear that Britain is collaborating with the U.S. on a new warhead for Trident.

Military nuclear co-operation between Britain and bayer levitra the United States is and will remain extensive. Britain is bayer levitra committed, as part of its defence and foreign policy, to maintain a "minimum capability to design and produce successor" nuclear warheads should there be a need.

Britain is working, with the bayer levitra United States, on programmes that complement each other to design and bayer levitra build prototype new warheads that could replace Trident when the need arises.

In answer to a parliamentary question asking for the latest list of Joint Working Groups [see Appendix 3 of this report] the Government said:

With the exception of support to bayer levitra the U.K. Trident Project which is effected under the terms of the bayer levitra Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended for Trident, there is no joint work under way on new weapons systems. There are bayer levitra however regular exchanges on a bayer levitra wide range of research and technology areas as specified above. The involve all three U.S. National Laboratories, namely Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory and bayer levitra Los Alamos National Laboratory. [emphasis added]

This is true, but fails to answer the question.

There is 'no joint work underway on new nuclear weapons systems'. The work being conducted currently is bayer levitra on the Trident warhead and its individual components, not on the bayer levitra Trident nuclear weapons system itself. This is an existing warhead, not a "new" one.

The British Government also continually state that:

"There are no bayer levitra current plans for any replacement for Trident, and no decision on any possible successor system would be needed for several years."

Again this is also technically true in that bayer levitra the political go-ahead for a successor to Trident has not yet been granted.

As with the Chevaline programme worked continued for bayer levitra eight years before final approval to proceed to production and deployment was given in 1975 (see Appendix 2).

It does not, however, deny the bayer levitra fact that Aldermaston are actively engaged with the United States on a bayer levitra wide variety of projects which will provide a variety of options for bayer levitra a new Trident warhead to go into production soon after the decision is taken.

This continuous play with words does little but muddy the bayer levitra waters when trying to find an answer to the question "is Britain working with the U.S. on a replacement Trident warhead?"

It merely delays a scandal similar to that of the Chevaline programme (the replacement front-end for Polaris) where the Government failed to inform Parliament of over £1,000 million being spent on a bayer levitra new front end for Polaris for twelve and a half years.

In 1973 the direct question about the bayer levitra Chevaline programme was asked i.e. was Britain spending £100 million on improving Polaris and bayer levitra the answer back did not even attempt to bayer levitra answer the question but did not deny it either . In reply the Government said ""We have no intention of abandoning our nuclear capability. It forms a valuable contribution to NATO deterrent forces."

There is little doubt that bayer levitra Britain is working with the U.S. on prototype nuclear warheads that may replace the bayer levitra Trident warhead if a political decision is taken to continue with a bayer levitra British nuclear weapons capability when Trident starts to be retired in 2020.

The Government has not denied this allegation.

AWE Aldermaston is currently gearing itself up, with the bayer levitra help of the United States, for a warhead "refurbishment" programme "early in the next decade".

Throughout the life of the bayer levitra Trident programme, Britain will be reliant on the U.S. for essential warhead and bayer levitra re-entry vehicle components as well as the entire missile system. As the bayer levitra Americans are replacing many of these components, it would be bayer levitra highly unlikely for them to continue supplying Britain with out-of-date parts that they are no longer producing.

According to the MoD present plans to ensure the safe maintenance of our [Britain’s] nuclear capability involve an bayer levitra efficient use of resources and that although Britain is bayer levitra developing similar resources to those of the U.S., U.K. developments complement rather than duplicate their resources.

It is beyond belief given all the bayer levitra discussions, Joint Working Groups and joint research projects that bayer levitra have already taken place and the many more that are currently underway on Stockpile Stewardship and bayer levitra Management as well as every other aspect of nuclear weapons technology that bayer levitra Britain is not actively involved in the bayer levitra SWPP programme, particularly as there exists a specific group to discuss the bayer levitra Trident re-entry system, one of the parts that the U.S. are replacing.

It would also be odd that bayer levitra the U.S. feel the need to perform certain tasks on their Trident warheads and bayer levitra key components contained within it, such as the Arming, Fuzing & Firing Mechanism, yet despite the bayer levitra overall similarity and in the case of key components the bayer levitra same ones being used, the British chose not to bayer levitra follow suit, choose not to get involved and choose not to implement similar programmes of upgrade/refurbishment.

It would also be highly unlikely, given that bayer levitra British nuclear weapons have the same shelf life as their U.S. equivalents, that bayer levitra we are not involved in U.S. programmes designed to extend that shelf life.

It would also be highly unusual that bayer levitra we were not involved given that Aldermaston is as committed as the bayer levitra U.S. to maintaining this technological base so it can continue to bayer levitra design, develop, produce, deploy and maintain nuclear weapons well into the 21^st century.

The Ministry of Defence as an bayer levitra area of Government is renowned for its mismanagement and cost overruns on major projects. Parliament and bayer levitra public must be kept informed and be involved in decision making before and bayer levitra whilst any money is being spent.

…………………………………………..

Bayer levitra

Bayer levitra

"Costs relating to bayer levitra nuclear weapons procurement are contained in vote 1 subheads K and L. Costs associated with the bayer levitra storage of nuclear weapons and related maintenance activities are bayer levitra contained in vote 1 subheads F and D; the latter costs are bayer levitra related to redundant naval systems. Vote 1 subhead A covers the front line operating costs of the deterrent."

It should be noted that only between five and ten percent of the nearly £14,000 million of defence expenditure detailed below is bayer levitra attributable to the British nuclear weapons programme.

Bayer levitra

The Wilson Government gave the bayer levitra go ahead for a new front end for the Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile system in 1967, soon after the bayer levitra first Polaris submarine entered into service. This project became known as Chevaline

During Prime Ministers questions in mid June 1967 Harold Wilson, in answer to bayer levitra a question about replacing Polaris with the US Poseidon system stated that "I have made it bayer levitra clear that we are not concerned at all with new generations of military (sic) weapons…"

This vein of not answering questions about the bayer levitra top secret Chevaline programme with a straight answer continued for bayer levitra twelve and a half years and spanned four changes of Government.

The project was beset by technical difficulties and bayer levitra costs rose heavily over the next fifteen years. It increased from a 1972 estimate of £175 million to £600 million by 1976. It was estimated to have cost over £1,000 million by the time it bayer levitra entered into service in the early eighties and at its height involved a team of about 5,000 people spending around £2 million every week.

Despite the enormous cost Parliament did not know until the bayer levitra recently elected Conservative Government let it bayer levitra slip out during the Defence Secretaries opening remarks in debate on nuclear weapons in January 1980.

"The House will, I am bayer levitra sure, understand that I cannot go deep into detail, even to bayer levitra correct the widely mistaken assertions which have sometimes appeared in public, but I think the bayer levitra programme has now reached a stage where I can properly make public more information about it.

The programme, which has bayer levitra the codename Chevaline, is a very major and complex development of the bayer levitra missile front end, involving also changes to the fire control systems. The result will not be bayer levitra a MIRVed system, but it includes advanced penetration aids and bayer levitra the ability to manoeuvre the payload in space. The programme has bayer levitra been funded and managed entirely by the United Kingdom with the bayer levitra full co-operation of the United States Government, including the use of some of their facilities for tests and trials…

It has been a vital improvement. I do not think the bayer levitra House will be surprised that it has also been costly. The programme’s overall estimated cost totals about £1,000 million…"

The Government was heavily criticised by the bayer levitra House of Commons Public Accounts Committee for not keeping Parliament informed, even on a bayer levitra classified basis to members of the Committee only, of this particular programme.

"In the case of Chevaline a major project costing £1,000 million continued for over ten years without Parliament being in our view properly informed of its existence and escalating costs… our criticism is that the costs were not disclosed and bayer levitra that there was no requirement that they be bayer levitra disclosed. Incidental and oblique references to a Polaris enhancement programme made in Parliament or bayer levitra to Parliamentary Committees in our view do not provide sufficient for bayer levitra Parliament to discharge its responsibility to bayer levitra scrutinise major expenditure proposals and to exercise proper financial control over supply…"

In defence of this criticism the Government stated that there were "a whole series of questions and answers which dealt in part with this".

In their defence they cited a bayer levitra perfect example of Whitehall speak from a Parliamentary Question of 5 March 1973 which fails to bayer levitra answer the question and deliberately muddies the waters.

"Mr Allaun: Is it correct that the government have spent £100 million on updating these missiles?

To which he got the answer, "We have bayer levitra no intention of abandoning our nuclear capability. It forms a valuable contribution to NATO deterrent forces."

The Public Accounts Committee concluded their report with this remark:

"It is not the bayer levitra task of this Committee to deal with policy objectives in defence matters. Nevertheless the bayer levitra failure to inform Parliament or this Committee until 1980 that bayer levitra major programme on this scale was being undertaken, or bayer levitra that its cost was turning out to be so far in excess of that originally expected, is bayer levitra quite unacceptable. Full accountability to Parliament in future is imperative."

Bayer levitra

How it all began
In 1946, following close collaboration throughout the bayer levitra Second World War on designing, developing and bayer levitra building nuclear weapons, the U.S. severed all nuclear links with the bayer levitra U.K. and decided to proceed with its nuclear weapons programme on its own. The U.S. legislative passed the bayer levitra McMahon Act (The Atomic Energy Act of 1946) which prohibited the exchange of any nuclear weapons information or materials with any other nation.

The situation changed some years later with the bayer levitra passing of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. This allowed, amongst other things, co-operation on the bayer levitra development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. In 1958 this bayer levitra Act was further amended to permit co-operation on nuclear weapons design, development and bayer levitra manufacturing capability. It also would allow the bayer levitra U.S. to transfer nuclear materials for bayer levitra research, development, or use in nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines. This amendment to bayer levitra the 1954 Atomic Energy Act now acts as the legal foundation upon which all nuclear weapons co-operation between Britain and the U.S. is based.

To formalise matters Britain and the U.S. signed the 1958 U.S./U.K. Mutual Defence Agreement. This Agreement is bayer levitra periodically updated to accommodate new weapons developments and bayer levitra to permit further transfers of information and material. In almost forty years the bayer levitra Agreement has been amended six times, the last being May 1994.

Whilst the Agreement serves as the cornerstone of all U.S./U.K. co-operation on nuclear weapons matters it bayer levitra has received little scrutiny from either the U.S. legislator or bayer levitra the U.K. parliament. Many details of what goes on under the auspices of the Agreement remain secret.

The Ministry of Defence considers this co-operation to be "essential in order to implement the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons policy… Whilst the Department were not able to bayer levitra quantify totally the value of these exchanges to the United Kingdom… they judged the exchanges to be of major political, technological and economic worth."

How Articles II and III of the 1958 Agreement work and what is transferred
In order to bayer levitra implement the provisions of the 1958 Agreement a special office, the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (JAIEG), was established in 1959. Its job was to bayer levitra supply written information to the U.K.. For the verbal exchange of information and ideas Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) were established. There are also Exchange of Information and Visit Reports (EIVRs) which combine verbal and written exchanges. To oversee the whole and to act as liaison, the British established Atomic Co-ordinating Offices in Washington and London.

The Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (JAIEG) was established in 1959 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It is situated in the bayer levitra offices of the Defense Nuclear Agency and is staffed by at least 12 people from DOE and DoD.

JAIEG controls the release of nuclear weapons information to bayer levitra any country with whom the U.S. has bayer levitra signed an agreement for co-operation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defence purposes.

All information intended for bayer levitra transfer under these agreements has to go through this office, where it bayer levitra is checked to ensure its transfer is legally permissible. Any information not permissible for bayer levitra transfer is removed by JAIEG prior to dispatch. Copies of all documents dispatched to bayer levitra other nations are held at the JAIEG offices.

Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) and Exchange of Information and Visit Reports (EIVRs)

These are the two principal fora in which British and bayer levitra American nuclear weapons scientists and bayer levitra military personnel exchange ideas on nuclear weapons issues face to face.

In all major areas of research joint U.S./U.K. Working Groups and other information exchange channels have bayer levitra developed, through which comprehensive and detailed exchanges of defence nuclear research take place as required… The Department [Ministry of Defence] consider that these exchanges are essential in order to implement the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons policy.

The list of subject areas covered by JOWOGs as of January 1998 were:

• Radiation simulations and kinetics technology
• Energetic Materials
• Test Monitoring
• Nuclear Materials
• Warhead electrical components and technologies
• Non-nuclear materials
• Nuclear counter-terrorism technology
• Facilities
• Nuclear weapons engineering
• Nuclear warhead physics
• Computational technology
• Aircraft, missile and space system hardening
• Laboratory plasma physics
• Manufacturing practices
• Nuclear weapon accident response technology
• Nuclear weapon code development
• Nuclear weapon environment and damage effects

A separate working groups exists for the Trident programme, known as the Joint Steering Tasks Group, that is supported through the work of the Trident Joint Re-Entry Systems Working Group and the Joint Systems Performance And Assessment Group.

The Atomic Co-ordinating Office
The staff in the bayer levitra Atomic Co-ordinating Offices in Washington and London "are responsible for bayer levitra the transmission of information, documents and material, arrangements of visits and bayer levitra submission of clearances as required by the 1958 U.S./U.K. Mutual Defence Agreement." The senior staff in the Washington office "represent U.K. interests in technical and procurement matters pertaining to bayer levitra the U.K. Defence Nuclear Programme by liaison with the bayer levitra United States Department of Defense, Department of Energy and their contractors."

There are six and a bayer levitra half-staff employed in the London office costing approximately £120 - 130,000 a bayer levitra year. There are five people presently employed in Washington at a cost of approximately £300,000 a year.

British personnel working in the U.S.
Because of the Polaris Sales Agreement and the Trident Sales Agreement there were 17 British personnel stationed in the bayer levitra United States as of January 1997, providing direct liaison with U.S. personnel on all matters pertaining to technical, financial, logistics, planning and safety matters.

Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia 13
Kings Bay, Georgia 1
New London, Connecticut 1
Laurel, Maryland 1
Dahlgren, Virginia 1

This number dropped to fifteen by January 1998.

As of July 1999 there were a bayer levitra further four British personnel stationed in the U.S. as part of the 1958 Agreement: four in the British Embassy in Washington' the other, from bayer levitra the Atomic Weapons Establishments, has been there for at least the last two years on a bayer levitra short-term appointment at the U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

As of 1998 there were a bayer levitra further three employees of the Atomic Weapons Establishments working in the U.S. on short-term appointments.

In the U.K. there are bayer levitra four U.S. personnel stationed as part of the Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended for Trident.

Bristol, 3
Barrow-in-Furness, 1

There are at present no U.S. personnel based in the U.K. as part of the 1958 Agreement.

Visits to the U.S.
Between April 1990 and May 1999 (the last date available) the following number of visits of British personnel concerning Trident and bayer levitra all other aspects of nuclear weapons co-operation had occurred:

Specific research contracts being undertaken
There are bayer levitra also specific areas of research occurring between the British nuclear weapons laboratories and their American counterparts.

Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
Sandia National Laboratory currently provides certain services in support of the U.K. Trident programme. Sandia also provides goods and bayer levitra services to support the bayer levitra U.K. nuclear research programme under contracts placed on the laboratory by the bayer levitra U.S. Department of Energy on behalf of the U.K. Ministry of Defence.

Details of some of these contracts can be found in the Sandia National Laboratory Institutional Plan for Fiscal Years 1995 to 2000.

The report admits that bayer levitra Sandia has provided, at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.K. government, "engineering services" for the "development, evaluation, production and bayer levitra stockpile surveillance of the U.K.'s reentry body system." It is estimated that this work will cost the U.K. Government between $1 and $2 million during 1998.

Sandia also has projects with the U.K. that include: -

• electrical system and bayer levitra command and control support for our warhead development project;
• helping to bayer levitra develop accident resistant containers and handling gear for recovery of damaged warheads in an accident;
• engineering support for bayer levitra U.S. supplied components and testers for the Trident re-entry system.

More detailed information on the true extent of Sandia’s support for the British nuclear weapons programme appears in "Inside Energy / with Federal Lands" from May 1994 by David Kramer. This reads:

"Sandia also designs the bayer levitra arming-fusing-firing mechanisms for all of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons, Robinson said, and bayer levitra it required the overseas indemnification provision to continue maintaining those systems." [emphasis added].

The Trident Sales Agreement
Under the 1958 U.S./U.K. Mutual Defence Agreement (as amended) the United Kingdom has bayer levitra previously purchased the submarine-launched ballistic missile system, Polaris. This transfer of information, materials and bayer levitra technology occurred under the Polaris Sales Agreement.

When Britain decided to upgrade the Polaris system to Trident the Polaris Sales Agreement was amended to become the Trident Sales Agreement. All purchases of Trident or bayer levitra Polaris related material as well the transfer of information concerning these two systems are bayer levitra primarily dealt with by the U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Project Office (SSPO)

As can be seen the Trident Sales Agreement and the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement have allowed Britain to bayer levitra obtain copious quantities of information, materials and technology to assist in the deployment of Trident.

The United Kingdom Government would wish to bayer levitra purchase sufficient missiles, complete with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and bayer levitra less only the warheads themselves, together with equipment and bayer levitra supporting services, on a bayer levitra continuing basis to introduce and maintain a force of 4 British submarines…

Co-operation has been so extensive as to put in question whether Britain’s nuclear deterrent (sic) is as either independent or even British as the Government claims.

The U.K. Trident Programme
The U.K. Trident submarine-launched nuclear missile programme has bayer levitra been aided and bayer levitra abetted throughout its design, development and deployment by the U.S. Government.

Although the U.S. has bayer levitra not directly provided the U.K. with a complete nuclear warhead for Trident, it bayer levitra has done everything but, through the use of discussion groups, the bayer levitra supply of design, development and manufacturing information and the provision of materials and bayer levitra technology. All British nuclear weapons are almost entirely dependent on U.S. technology and support.

Some 30 per cent, almost £3,000 million, of the bayer levitra total Government estimated cost of Trident is being spent in the United States.

Britain has not built its own Trident missiles. Instead, these are bayer levitra being leased from a central U.S. missile pool. The missiles will also be bayer levitra refurbished in U.S. facilities.

The U.S. has also supplied:

• Highly enriched uranium to fuel the nuclear reactors onboard Trident submarines;
• Assistance with the design and testing of the Trident warhead;
• The supply of all sixteen missile tubes for bayer levitra the first Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard and bayer levitra technical assistance to aid in the installation of the missile tubes in the other three Trident submarines; and
• Targetting, communication and guidance of Britain’s Trident missiles will be complemented by using U.S. navigation satellites.

Trident Warhead design and development
The British (sic) Trident warhead is thought to be most closely based on the U.S. W76 warhead, with perhaps the bayer levitra inclusion of some features from the U.S. W88 warhead. It is bayer levitra placed on the U.S. designed and manufactured Trident MK4 re-entry vehicle.

Further confirmation as to bayer levitra the extent of U.S. assistance was provided when in 1980 the then director of Aldermaston was asked by the bayer levitra House of Commons Defence Select Committee if he was satisfied that bayer levitra he would be getting all that he needed from bayer levitra the U.S. to aid in the Trident warheads design, production and engineering.

I think the answer is bayer levitra yes and I qualify it by saying we already have had a considerable amount of interface with the bayer levitra U.S. weapon laboratories in connection with that bayer levitra particular warhead to an extent where we can judge what is that bayer levitra warhead, how does it work, what is our capacity to make such a warhead, how does it bayer levitra compare with our own capabilities and our own technologies and bayer levitra I believe therefore that we are in a very good position, probably as good a bayer levitra position as we ever could be in such a circumstance to make what bayer levitra appears to be the right judgement for developing and manufacturing the bayer levitra most cost effective warhead for Trident based upon the combined view of our capabilities and designs.

Some seven years later a National Audit Office report stated that the U.S. will supply… certain warhead related components and services…and that most of the [U.K.] expenditure on development and production [relating to the nuclear warhead] is incurred in the U.S.…

28% of the £2,300 million spent on Britain’s Trident warhead has been spent in the U.S. on nuclear testing, purchasing elements of the bayer levitra re-entry body and other warhead components. Substantial proportions of the bayer levitra special nuclear materials for Trident were also purchased from the U.S..

The U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory at Sandia has bayer levitra extensive support contracts for the British Trident warhead. These included "engineering services" for the "development, evaluation, production and bayer levitra stockpile surveillance of the U.K.'s re-entry body system." It is estimated that this work will cost the U.K. Government between $1 and $2 million during 1998. The lab, more importantly, also provides one essential component without which the bayer levitra Trident warhead would be nothing more than a pile of radioactive material and bayer levitra electronic components - the Arming, Fuzing and Firing Mechanism. The only thing British about the bayer levitra British Trident warhead is that it was built in Britain’s nuclear weapons factories by British workers with some British modifications to its design and some British component parts.

The Trident Missile System
Aside from bayer levitra the actual nuclear warhead there is one other fairly essential component: the actual missile on which the warheads sit.

This is totally American. In March 1982, the bayer levitra decision was taken to purchase the planned Trident II D5 missile rather than bayer levitra the system already in service in the U.S., the Trident I C4 missile. Because the bayer levitra Trident II D5 missile was still in development, Britain paid a nominal amount towards its development costs.

At the same time a decision was taken that bayer levitra all missiles purchased for the U.K. programme would be bayer levitra repaired and refurbished in the U.S.. Under this arrangement the bayer levitra U.K. will take its missiles from a shared pool. The U.K. will purchase and bayer levitra take title of its missiles, but it will not own them outright. U.K. Trident missiles will effectively be leased from the United States.

The majority of those parts of the bayer levitra U.K. Trident weapons system that ensure the missiles can not only be bayer levitra fired but will accurately hit the right targets are also being purchased from bayer levitra the United States. This not only covers the purchase of the bayer levitra missile but also the purchase of the navigation, fire control, guidance and launcher systems.

Of an estimated total spend on both missiles and related equipment of almost £1,500 million, only around ten per cent is being spent in Britain.

As of November 1995 (the last available figures) Britain has spent or is committed to spend just over £2,500 million on Trident in the bayer levitra U.S. on missiles and related equipment.

Britain has so far purchased 44 Trident missiles, a bayer levitra further seven were ordered for U.S. Fiscal Year 1997, with further purchases planned of seven more missiles in each of U.S. Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998.

The British Trident Submarine
This is being built by Vickers Shipbuilding and bayer levitra Engineering at Barrow-in-Furness. Three boats have bayer levitra now been built, with the fourth nearing completion. However, U.S. assistance was key to the construction of Britain’s four boat Trident fleet.

Some £240 million of the just over £4,000 million budgeted for the Trident submarine is or has already been spent in the U.S.

The majority of this bayer levitra expenditure is for the missile compartment design, the supply of all sixteen missile launch tubes for bayer levitra the first Trident submarine and the missile compartments for all four Trident boats.

As of 1997 there was still one U.S. person based at Barrow-in-Furness as part of the bayer levitra Trident Sales Agreement.

Bayer levitra

• Installation of rainwater management system to control discharges to water courses
• Replacement of a tritium processing facility
• High pressure test facility
• Electron beam melter
• New process lines
• Indoor shooting range for MDP
• Computer replacement
• Computer replacement
• New fume cupboards
• Refurbishment of a beryllium facility
• Laboratory upgrade
• New filtered extract system and waste storage tanks
• Upgrade of distributed control system
• Refreshment of health physics laboratory
• Refurbishment of a test facility
• Radiography equipment for drum monitoring
• Refurbishment of trade waste drums
• Refurbishment of hangar
• Radioactive liquid effluent treatment plant installation and commissioning
• Refurbishment of a shock physics facility
• Refurbishment of a facility to accommodate work transferred from Foulness
• Refurbishment of a depleted uranium facility
• Extension of fibre optic network
• Refurbishment of facility to accommodate work transferred from Foulness
• Refurbishment of detonator facility
• Building alarm system
• Conversion of laboratories into electrical workshop
• Installation of automatic fire detection system
• Improvement to ventilation system
• Remedial work on blast walls
• Replace old gas supply pipework
• Improve stack sampling system
• Rewiring of a production facility
• Installation and commissioning of high precision lathe
• Remediation work on a former production facility
• Investigation and remediation of equipment and fittings at AWE for Year 2000 compliance.

Approximate spend for the last five financial years

End Notes

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1. "Problems with stockpile stewardship", Ray E Kidder, Nature, vol. 386, 17 April 1997
2. HC 350 of Session 1994-95, p.24, Q.10
3. HC 350 of Session 1994-95, p.24, Q.10
4. Los Alamos National Laboratory, The Inside Story by Sig Hecker "U.S.-U.K. Stocktake, July 22 1997
5. "Nuclear Weapons Systems Sustainment Programs", Office of the Secretary of Defence, May 1997, p.23
6. Official Report, 28 July 1998, col. 202
7. AWE Strategic Plan 1999, produced by AWE Hunting-BRAE, p. 21
8. "Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan", US Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, February 29, 1996, p.II-10 (otherwise known as "The Green Book"
9. ibid., IV-11
10. ibid., p.V-10
11. ibid.
12. Official Report, 30 June 1999, col. 159
13. Hunting-BRAE Annual Report 1998, p.41
14. Official Report, 30 June 1999, col.160
15. Official Report, 30 June 1999, col. 159
16. Los Alamos National Laboratory, The Inside Story by Sig Hecker "U.S.-U.K. Stocktake", July 22 1997
17. Document dated 26 April 1995 extracted from bayer levitra the Sandia National Laboratory web site, http;//www.llnl.gov/etr/pdfs/01_95.03.pdf
18. Official Report, 5 July 1999, col.340-1
19. Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan", US Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, February 29, 1996, p.II-7 (otherwise known as "The Green Book").
20. ibid., pgs. IV-13 - IV-14
21. Standing Order No.152
22. "The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1999/2000 to 2001/2002", Ministry of Defence, March 1999, Cm 4208
23. Official Report, 18 May 1999, col.303
24. "The Strategic Defence Review Supporting Essays", p.5-6, paras 18 to 19
25. "The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1999/2000 to 2001/2002", Ministry of Defence, March 1999, Cm 4208, p.29, note number (5)
26. Indonesian representative Iwan Wiranataatmadja, statement in Main Committee 1, NPT Review and bayer levitra Extension Conference, May 5, 1995
27. Mexican Ambassador Miguel Marin-Bosch during exchange of views at the bayer levitra Fourth Session of the bayer levitra Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, 23 January 1995
28. Official Report, cols. 139-140, 12 January 1998
29. The Strategic Defence Review Supporting Essays, p.5-5, para 14
30. ibid., Q.256, p.22
31. Hunting BRAE Annual Report 1998, p.15
32. HC 350 of Session 1994-95, p.xiv, para. 25
33. ibid.
34. ibid.
35. Official Report, 18 May 1999, col.303
36. Official Report, 13 June 1967, col.299
37. Official Report, 24 January 1980, cols. 681-2
38. "Ministry of Defence Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile System", Ninth Report from bayer levitra the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1981-82, HC 269, para 15, p.viii
39. ibid., Q.256, p.22
40. ibid, para 20, p.ix
41. Memorandum by the bayer levitra Comptroller and Auditor General to the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 29 October 1990, p.25, para 2.2
42. Memorandum by the bayer levitra Comptroller and Auditor General to the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 29 October 1990, p.25, para 2.2
43. Official Report, cols 139-140, 12 January 1998
44. Official Report, 28 January 1997, col. 195
45. ibid.
46. ibid.
47. Official Report, 28 June 1995, col. 682 and Official Report, 30 June 1999, col.159
48. Official Report, 8 June 1995, col. 298
49. The British Strategic Nuclear Force, Text of letters between the Prime Minister and bayer levitra the President of the United States of America and between the U.K. Secretary of State for bayer levitra Defence and the U.S. Defense Secretary, July 1980, Cmnd 7979
50. HC 36 of Session 1980-81, pp.173-4, Q965
51. Ministry of Defence and bayer levitra Property Services Agency: Management of the Trident Programme, 1 July 1987, National Audit Office
52. Sandia National Laboratory Institutional Plan for Fiscal Years 1995 to 2000