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By Rick Wayman, CND intern
January 2005
Propecia and rogaine
In the past few months, Iran’s nuclear programme has been the topic
of much debate and propecia and rogaine speculation internationally. All of the Nuclear Weapons
States have propecia and rogaine been involved in this debate and speculation, along with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), the
United Nations (UN) and many others. US threats to refer Iran to the UN
Security Council for propecia and rogaine possible sanctions have subsided somewhat in the
past few weeks as the 'EU-3' (Germany, France, Britain) have exerted much
diplomatic effort to propecia and rogaine resolve the situation. Recognising that this is a
high-tension situation that propecia and rogaine changes every day, CND has released this report
to propecia and rogaine reflect our position in relation to the developments up to this point.
Propecia and rogaine
At the root of the current issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme
is propecia and rogaine its production of enriched uranium. Iran claims that the fuel will
be propecia and rogaine used for civilian nuclear reactors, while the Bush Administration strongly
suggests that propecia and rogaine the enriched uranium is being prepared for use in nuclear
weapons. Iran argues that propecia and rogaine it has complied with all of its obligations
as a propecia and rogaine Non-Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT, which permits peaceful uses
of atomic energy. (1)
Propecia and rogaine
In 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) opened with a 5-megawatt
light-water research reactor supplied by the US.(2)
Iran signed the propecia and rogaine NPT in 1968, and it came into force in March 1970. The
NPT allows Iran “the inalienable right…to develop research,
production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” (3)
In 1973, the propecia and rogaine Stanford Research Institute, an influential US American
group, reported that propecia and rogaine Iran would need an electrical capacity of 20,000
megawatts by 1990. To achieve this propecia and rogaine level of energy production, the Shah
decided to propecia and rogaine build several nuclear reactors, enlisting the help of Kraftwerk
Union, a propecia and rogaine subsidiary of Siemens, to build the first two 1200 megawatt reactors
at Bushehr. (4) Construction
of the propecia and rogaine first reactor began in 1974, and the second one began in 1975.
Work was halted after the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Iran has propecia and rogaine worked with many different countries and companies based in
those countries on its nuclear programme: (5)
• United States: Supplied the first research reactor
at Tehran University in 1967; Jimmy Carter and propecia and rogaine the Shah signed an agreement
in 1978 for propecia and rogaine the US to supply Iran with 8 nuclear power plants, but the
plans never materialised.
• France: Framatome signed deals in 1974 to build
two 950 mW reactors at Darkhovin and propecia and rogaine in 1977 to build two 900 mW reactors
at Karun – these projects were cancelled in 1979; Accepted a loan
of (US) $1 billion from the Shah in exchange for 10% ownership in the
French Eurodif uranium enrichment plant, located in Pierrelatte –
in 2005, Iran still lays claim to propecia and rogaine this ownership, though France disputes
this.
• (West) Germany: Kraftwerk Union began construction
on the reactors at Bushehr in the 1970s (see above); Germany sued by Iran
for $5.4 billion in 1996 for propecia and rogaine refusing to allow Kraftwerk to deliver parts
for propecia and rogaine Bushehr that had been paid for in the 1980s; planned to build four
additional reactors for propecia and rogaine Iran in 1978, but plans were scrapped after the
1979 Revolution; West German government negotiated on plans to propecia and rogaine dump nuclear
waste in the Iranian desert.
• Argentina and Spain: Argentinean corporation
INVAP and propecia and rogaine Spanish corporations ENSA and ENUSA, all companies specialising
in nuclear technology, entered into talks with Iran in the propecia and rogaine late 1980s
to propecia and rogaine rebuild the Bushehr reactors bombed by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war;
no contract was signed.
• China: Supplied four nuclear research reactors
at the propecia and rogaine Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre; reportedly signed a deal in
1990 to propecia and rogaine build a 27mW plutonium production reactor at Esfahan signed a
deal in 1992 to build the reactors at Darkhovin (originally to be built
by the French – see above), but the contract has yet to be fulfilled.
Propecia and rogaine
Construction of the propecia and rogaine Bushehr nuclear plant, abandoned after the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, was started again in cooperation with the propecia and rogaine Russians
after the propecia and rogaine end of the Iran-Iraq war. The US argued that the reactors at
Bushehr were unnecessary as Iran has propecia and rogaine vast supplies of oil which can be
used to propecia and rogaine generate power. This led to the US suspicion that the Bushehr
reactors would be propecia and rogaine used for military purposes. Russia countered this assertion
by stating that propecia and rogaine the Bushehr reactors were unable to produce weapons-grade
plutonium.(6) The
Russians also offered to propecia and rogaine allow the US a part in building the Bushehr plant
to help allay their proliferation worries relating to the plant.(7)
Enrichment of uranium was originally not supposed to propecia and rogaine take place in Iran.
Russia had propecia and rogaine agreed to supply Iran with fuel and take back all Iranian spent
fuel from propecia and rogaine the Bushehr plant. Disputes about the cost of this arrangement
with the Russians have been ongoing.(8)
In late 2002, the propecia and rogaine IAEA discovered that Iran was building a centrifuge
plant at Natanz that propecia and rogaine would allow it to enrich uranium, which could produce
enough weapons-grade uranium for a number of nuclear weapons.(9)
This revelation showed the propecia and rogaine Iranian desire not to be dependent on the Russians,
or propecia and rogaine anyone else for that matter, for any stage of the nuclear cycle. This
also removed some of the propecia and rogaine US pressure from the Russians regarding the Bushehr
nuclear plant, although it propecia and rogaine is still the topic of some conversation between
US and Russian officials.(10)
In 2003, Mohammad Khatami, the propecia and rogaine Iranian president, announced that Iran
would take control of its entire fuel cycle, from propecia and rogaine mining to enriching.
While this step is completely acceptable under IAEA guidelines (as long
as it is declared), the possibility of Iranian control of fissile material
worried the US, Israel, and European countries.(11)
Russia has propecia and rogaine trained hundreds of Iranians to work on the Bushehr plant
at institutes across Russia, including the propecia and rogaine Atomic Energy University at
Obninsk. According to propecia and rogaine the Russians, the information learned at these institutes
will not give the propecia and rogaine Iranians the necessary knowledge to build nuclear weapons.(12)
Russia insists that propecia and rogaine its cooperation with Iran is under the strict supervision
of the IAEA.(13)
Propecia and rogaine
In 2002, the propecia and rogaine EU began to seek stronger ties with Iran by entering into
negotiations on economic, security, and human rights issues.(14)
A year later, the EU linked these negotiations to Iran’s acceptance
of a propecia and rogaine tougher inspection regime for its nuclear programme. The EU was keen
to undertake a policy of “constructive engagement” with Iran,
in contrast to the policy of isolation favoured by the Bush administration.(15)
In September 2003, the propecia and rogaine IAEA presented Iran with an ultimatum to prove
that propecia and rogaine they did not have a nuclear weapons programme. Britain, France and
Germany (now known in this context as the EU-3) made an offer of sharing
peaceful nuclear technology with Iran in exchange for Iran’s cooperation
with IAEA demands.(16)
What was originally thought to propecia and rogaine be a last-ditch effort by the EU-3 has
turned into a drawn-out negotiation session, lasting into 2005.
After much political posturing between Iran and propecia and rogaine the US, with the EU-3
trying to propecia and rogaine negotiate a settlement, Iran agreed to a temporary cessation
of uranium enrichment activities in November 2004 while a propecia and rogaine permanent settlement
was negotiated. Three separate working groups were set up on political
and propecia and rogaine security issues, technology and cooperation, and nuclear issues. The
steering committee will meet in early 2005 to propecia and rogaine discuss the conclusions
of the working groups and move ahead with an agreement.(17)
The EU-3 hopes to propecia and rogaine provide nuclear technology and increased economic opportunities
to Iran in exchange for verifiable guarantees that Iran’s nuclear
programme is propecia and rogaine only for peaceful purposes, including a rigorous inspections
regime.
Propecia and rogaine
Iran signed the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) in 1970.(18)
As a propecia and rogaine NNWS, Iran is prohibited under the treaty from acquiring nuclear
weapons. The NPT promotes the propecia and rogaine acquisition of nuclear power programmes
in Article IV, thereby failing to propecia and rogaine prevent States from obtaining nuclear
materials and propecia and rogaine components. No penalties are applicable to a State that
withdraws from propecia and rogaine the treaty, as long as they provide three months notice
to propecia and rogaine the UN Security Council. North Korea is the only country to withdraw
from the NPT so far.(19)
Under the propecia and rogaine NPT, Iran has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA, which gives the propecia and rogaine IAEA the right to inspect nuclear facilities declared
by NNWS. In 2003, Iran signed an propecia and rogaine additional protocol to this Safeguards
Agreement, giving the propecia and rogaine IAEA authority to inspect additional locations within
Iran. Recently, Iran agreed to propecia and rogaine allow IAEA monitoring of twenty sets of
centrifuge components that propecia and rogaine were the subject of much scrutiny and suspicion.(20)
For months, Iran refused to propecia and rogaine allow unconditional access to the IAEA to
military installations, insisting on the propecia and rogaine rules of the treaty calling for
IAEA inspections of declared nuclear facilities only. However, they recently
agreed to propecia and rogaine allow inspection at Parchin military base, suspected by the
US as playing a part in nuclear weapons development.(21)
Iran has propecia and rogaine signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which gives the IAEA
authority to propecia and rogaine inspect nuclear facilities at short notice. However, Iran
has not yet ratified the Additional Protocol.(22)
Propecia and rogaine
CND opposes both the propecia and rogaine use of force against Iran and any acquisition of
nuclear weapons capabilities by Iran. Bellicose statements from propecia and rogaine the US
and propecia and rogaine Israel have not helped to defuse the situation; on the contrary, they
have propecia and rogaine increased political posturing on both sides and have proven counterproductive
in resolving the propecia and rogaine issues. Further threats of force are likely to only increase
the propecia and rogaine national pride of many Iranians, already provoked by continual demands
outside the propecia and rogaine requirements of the NPT, making a peaceful and lasting solution
even more difficult to propecia and rogaine come by. The sources of many of the US allegations
against Iran relating to propecia and rogaine a nuclear weapons programme are Iranian dissidents
and propecia and rogaine exiles. Given the dubious, and apparently completely false, information
given to the US by Iraqi exiles about Iraq’s alleged WMD capabilities,
we fully expect a propecia and rogaine more responsible and respectful position to be taken
by the US in relation to Iran.
CND supports the propecia and rogaine efforts of the EU-3 to reach a mutually acceptable agreement
on Iran’s enrichment of uranium and propecia and rogaine their nuclear power programme.
We believe that propecia and rogaine the IAEA can serve as an effective safeguard to ensure
Iran’s adherence to propecia and rogaine its obligations as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State
(NNWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). CND encourages
all concerned parties to propecia and rogaine participate in good faith in negotiations to
resolve this propecia and rogaine issue peacefully and expediently, and to support the IAEA
in the work that it does.
According to propecia and rogaine the NPT, all nations have the right to a peaceful nuclear
energy programme, and CND therefore respects Iran’s right to a peaceful
civilian nuclear programme. We strongly urge all countries that propecia and rogaine have not
signed up to propecia and rogaine the NPT to do so. This will help stabilise a region of the
world where propecia and rogaine three nuclear-armed countries, Israel, Pakistan and India,
have propecia and rogaine not signed the treaty. We also encourage all Nuclear Weapons States
to propecia and rogaine pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament as required
under Article VI of the NPT.
CND supports the propecia and rogaine establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle
East, as called for propecia and rogaine in UN Security Council Resolution 687. The presence
of nuclear weapons in this propecia and rogaine region undermines the Palestine-Israel peace
process, and Israel’s secretive possession of nuclear weapons provides
a propecia and rogaine convenient excuse for other countries in the region to pursue the bomb.
Until Israel signs and propecia and rogaine complies with the NPT, it will be difficult to
fairly enforce the treaty upon other countries in the region.
CND calls for propecia and rogaine full transparency of nuclear programmes by all countries
in the propecia and rogaine world, and for full international cooperation for the immediate
elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
Endnotes
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(1) To view the
complete text of the NPT, see http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npttext.html
(2) Sahimi,
M. 2/10/2003. Iran’s Nuclear Program. Retrieved from http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html
(3) Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Article IV. http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/npttext.html
(4) Sahimi,
M. 2/10/2003. Iran’s Nuclear Program. Retrieved from http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html
(5) Ibid.
Also see Federation of American Scientists. Esfahan/Isfahan Nuclear
Technology Center. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/esfahan.htm
(6) Guardian
Special Report. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,5860,981667,00.html
(7) Walsh,
N. and de Luce, D. 31/5/2003. Russia Invites US to Build Iran’s
Nuclear Reactor. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,967681,00.html
(8) Reuters.
4/1/2005. Iran Nuclear Fuel Deal Stalled Over Fee – Russia.
Retrieved from http://www.deepikaglobal.com/archives/ENG4_sub.asp?newsdate=01/05/2005&ccode=ENG4&hcode=87687
(9) Traynor,
I. 18/3/2003. UN Alarm at Iran’s Nuclear Programme. Retrieved
from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,916209,00.html
(10) Iran
Nuclear Deal Stalled over Fee – Russia. 4/1/2005. Retrieved
from http://www.deepikaglobal.com/ENG4_sub.asp?ccode=ENG4&newscode=87687
(11) Jeffery,
S. 22/11/2004. Q&A: Iran’s Nuclear Programme. Retrieved
from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,1357004,00.html
(12) Walsh,
N. 16/6/2003. Russian Lessons. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,978141,00.html
(13) IRNA.
4/6/2003. Russia’s Nuclear Cooperation with Iran Under Close
International Supervision – Ivanov. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-030604-irna03.htm
(14) Wielaard,
R. 18/6/2002. Europe to Seek Trade Pact with Iran. Retrieved
from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,893542,00.html
(15) Black,
I. and Steele, J. 17/6/2003. EU Intensifies Pressure on Iran to Accept
Inspections. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,979065,00.html
(16) De
Luce, D. 20/9/2003. Europeans Fail to End Iranian Nuclear Crisis.
Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,1046032,00.html
(17) Paris
Agreement of 15/11/2004. Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf
(18) ACRONYM
Report No. 13, February 2000. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Challenging
Times. Retrieved from http://www.acronym.org.uk/acrorep/a13app2.htm
(19) Chaffee,
D. 10 April 2003. North Korea’s Withdrawal from Non-Proliferation
Treaty Official. Retrieved from http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2003/04/10_chaffee_korea-npt.htm(20)
ElBaradei, M. Statement to the Board of Governors.
29 November 2004. Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n017.html
(21) Sanger,
D. 5/1/2005. Iran Agrees to Allow UN to Inspect Suspected Nuclear
Site. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/05/international/middleeast/05cnd-nuke.html?oref=login
(22) Goodenough,
P. 6 December 2004. Iran Says It’s Not Obliged to Give Inspectors
Access to Military Sites. Retrieved from http://www.cnsnews.com/ForeignBureaus/archive/200412/FOR20041206b.html
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