As demands to halt Iran’s nuclear programme through military action increase, the organisation Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) has published a report highlighting the potential dangers this would entail.
Iran’s nuclear facilities, numbering fifteen in total, include uranium enrichment facilities as well as power plants. A report in November 2011 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed concerns over potential military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. The more generally expressed fear is that eventually Iranian nuclear facilities could be used to produce weapons grade uranium or plutonium.
Whilst acknowledging the possibility of undeclared equipment in the country, SGR’s Dr. Stuart Parkinson states that the quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium needed for weapons is large enough for production to be detected by the IAEA, whose safeguards would be broken long before the arms were completed.
The IAEA’s November report concluded that most evidence of military-based nuclear activity in Iran related to a former programme, abandoned in 2003, casting further doubt over the current development of nuclear weapons.
Beyond this ambiguity, Parkinson warns against pre-emptive military air strikes, not only because the facilities are located over a diverse area (with two underground, making them extremely difficult to target), but also because of the impact on and reaction of the Iranian population. Whilst scientists would be likely to redevelop the programme, he suggests that the move could also quite logically cause the population to “unite around the current government and support any subsequent moves to attain a nuclear weapon for deterrent purposes.” Parkinson continues:
“The Iranian government could then embark on a ‘crash’ nuclear programme. This would first include withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, with its detailed inspection regimes and technical restrictions, allowing it to rapidly pursue one of a number of weapons production paths – using either uranium or plutonium. The specific option chosen and the speed with which it would be pursued would depend on the extent of the damage to its major facilities and the degree to which secret stores and facilities are available. Purchases of additional supplies on the black market would add to this capability. The only way to try to prevent such a scenario would be continued air attacks – probably over a prolonged period. A major armed conflict would thus become very likely.”
The impacts of this would be catastrophic. To avoid such a risk, diplomatic initiatives such as a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East or steps towards an international programme on renewable energy could be taken, both of which are suited to Iran’s environment.
Further details on these and the background to the conflict can be found in the full report which can be accessed here: The Dangers of a Military Attack on Iran's Nuclear Programme.